安乐哲 著《一多不分：儒学与世界文化新秩序》出版

书名：《一多不分：儒学与世界文化新秩序》

主编：[美]安乐哲  

出版社：山东友谊出版社

【内容简介】

本书收录儒学大家安乐哲先生近年来的论文集、演讲稿和访谈录。在本书中，安乐哲先生在比较中西两大传统阐释的大视野下，用中国“一多不分”互系性话语体系，讲述儒家思想对个人修养、家庭和社会的价值，以及对人工智能等新兴领域的哲学思考。安乐哲先生认为，儒家思想是生机盎然、充满活力与包容性的思想传统，儒家角色伦理根深深植于家国关系之中，依然生生不息，可以成为全球性哲学、思想与文化资源的重要部分，可以预见，儒家角色伦理学将会为促进世界新经济和新文化秩序做出积极贡献。

【作者简介】

安乐哲，1947年出生于加拿大多伦多，世界著名中西比较哲学家，国际知名汉学大师，山东省“儒学大家”，孔子研究院特聘专家。曾任夏威夷大学哲学系教授，现任北京大学哲学系人文讲席教授，世界儒学文化研究联合会会长，国际儒学联合会副会长，尼山圣源书院顾问，北京中外文化交流研究基地顾问，北京外国语大学中华文化国际传播研究院外籍首席专家。

2013年因其对中国思想多年来的出色研究获得“孔子文化奖”。2016年，荣获第二届“会林文化奖”。2018年，荣获“文明之光·2018中国文化交流年度人物”；并荣获“北京大学燕园友谊奖”；2019年，荣获“杜威学术学会2019终身成就奖”；2021年，荣获“中国政府友谊奖”。安乐哲教授翻译了《论语》、《大学》、《中庸》、《道德经》、《孝经》、《淮南子》、《孙子兵法》等书而蜚声海内外，著有：《儒家角色伦理学》、《儒家角色伦理——21世纪道德视野》《先贤的民主：杜威、孔子与中国民主之希望》《通过汉代而思》《主术：中国古代政冶制度之研究》《通过孔子而思》等。

【目录】

序言

第一部分讲稿：儒学与第二次启蒙

知己知彼：中西阐释域境的相互镜鉴

古代人类兼容并蓄的天下观在当代世界的绵延呈现

儒学之“人”对改变世界文化秩序的作用

儒学价值观与第二次启蒙时代

适应需求，融合发展——儒学文化的变通发展动力

儒学与新丝绸之路

第二部分访谈：儒学与全球合作共赢

哲学的最后一站不是真理，而是智性对话

儒者·儒行·儒学

“西儒”是怎样看“东儒”的？

哲人译哲：中国哲学典籍英译路径探析

借用儒学“仁”的观念实现全球合作共赢

中西对话的拓荒者：哲学与汉学之间的比较哲学家

儒家中国与变化中的世界秩序

第三部分论文：儒学将重塑世界文化

人类命运共同体：“一多不分”的新世界文化秩序

卸下本质主义的指控：对文化哲学的一些方法论思考

《学记》——立儒家教育之根本

“学以成人”：论儒学对世界文化秩序变化的贡献

“人”还是“成人”：阳明学知行合一思想的源流

余纪元与为儒家哲学而翻新“形而上学”

——人“生而既成”还是“做人成仁”？

人工智能：将“自然智能”置于《易经》宇宙论的框架之内

汤一介先生的哲学馈赠——让东西方哲学的不对称成为过去

后记

【序言】

Preface

Roger T.Ames

The title of this book is 一多不分. And from the beginning, the 安乐哲儒学大家团体 has itself been a demonstration of this fundamental Confucian postulate. The articles, lectures, and interviews, contained in this volume tell the story of our team—Tian Chenshan, Wen Haiming, Zhang Kai, Bian Junfeng, and Sun Zhihui—have over the past five years criss-crossed China, East-Asia, and the world promoting a better understanding of Confucian philosophy. Together we have set our root 扎根 and grown 生長our project with a “duo 多“ that has enabled us to become a unique “yi一.” We have enjoyed the partnership of and joined in common cause with the Kongzi Yanjiuyuan, the World Consortium for Research in Confucian Cultures, the International Confucian Association, the Peking University Berggruen Research Center, the Beiwai Sinology Center, the Beishida Academy for the International Communication of Chinese Culture, the Danyang Traditional Culture Society, the Dewey Center at Fudan University, and many other wonderful organizations.

Over the past generation, a sea change has occurred in the economic and political order of the world, and we have anticipated that this great transformation will be followed by the emergence of a new world cultural order. And we believe firmly that the pan-Asian tradition of Confucian philosophy has an important contribution to make to the dawning of this new world order. The rise of East Asia and of China in particular has been precipitous, and has in many ways startled a world dominated by the liberal values of a foundational individualism. A fundamental premise that runs throughout these pages is that the most important contribution this Confucian tradition has to make to a changing world cultural order is an alternative to the ideology of individualism.We must locate this notion of a relationally-constituted conception of “human becomings” within the generic features of an early Chinese process or “event” ontology in which putative “things” and their contexts are interdependent and thus inseparable. What it means to become human, far from referencing an antecedent given that takes us back to our origins (eidos) or forward to some given, pre-determined end (telos), is in fact a provisional and emergent process within the context of an evolving cosmic order. It is just such a worldview that I and my collaborators following Marcel Granet, Tang Junyi, Fei Xiaotong, Joseph Needham, and Angus Graham have argued for at length as the most appropriate interpretive context for understanding classical Confucianism.

As my starting point, I have posited a contrast between a classical Greek ontological conception of human “beings” and a classical Yijing 易經orBook of Changes process conception of what I will call human “becomings,” a contrast between “on-tology” as “the science of being per se” and what I will call “zoe-tology” (shengshenglun 生生論) as “the art of living,” a contrast between a human being as a noun and human becomings as a gerunds. John Dewey abjuring what he calls “the philosophical fallacy” makes this same point in alerting us to our inveterate habit of decontextualizing and essentializing one element within the continuity of experience, and then in our best efforts to overcome this post hoc diremption, of then construing this same element as foundational and causal. As a concrete example of this habit, we achieve virtuosity in the process of our ongoing conduct, abstract something called “virtue” out of the complexity of this continuing experience, and then make the abstraction antecedent to and causal of the process itself. For Dewey,

…the reality is the growth-process itself . . . The real existence is the history in its entirety, the history just as what it is. The operations of splitting it up into two parts and then having to unite them again by appeal to causative power are equally arbitrary and gratuitous.

The classical Greeks give us a substance ontology grounded in “being qua being” or “being per se” (to on he on) that guarantees a permanent and unchanging subject as the substratum for the human experience. With the combination of eidosand telos as the formal and final cause of independent things such as persons, this “sub-stance” necessarily persists through change. This kind of causal thinking is precisely what Dewey is referencing in his concern about the philosophical fallacy. In this ontology, “to exist” and “to be” are implicated in one term. The same copula verb answers the two-fold questions of first why something exists, that is, its origins and its goal, and then whatit is, its substance. This substratum or essence includes its purpose for being, and is defining of the “what-it-means-to-be-a-thing-of-this-kind” of any particular thing in setting a closed, exclusive boundary and the strict identity necessary for it to be this, and not that.

The question of why something exists is answered by an appeal to determinative, originative, and undemonstrable first principles (Gk.arche, L. principium), and provides the metaphysical separation between creator and creature. The question of what something is, is answered by its limitation and definition, and provides the ontological distinction between substance and accident, between essence and its contingent attributes. In expressing the necessity, self-sufficiency, and independence of things, this substance or essence as the subject of predication is the object of knowledge. It tells us, as a matter of logical necessity, what is what, and is the source of truth in revealing to us with certainty, what is real and what is not. As the contemporary philosopher Zhao Tingyang 趙汀陽avers, this kind of substance ontology defining the real things that constitute the content of an orderly and structured cosmos

…provides a “dictionary” kind of explanation of the world, seeking to set up an accurate understanding of the limits of all things. In simple terms, it determines “what is what” and all concepts are footnotes to “being” or “is.”

In the Book of Changes we find a vocabulary that makes explicit cosmological assumptions that are a stark alternative to this substance ontology, and provides the interpretive context for the Confucian canons by locating them within a holistic, organic, and ecological worldview. This cosmology begins from “living” (sheng 生) itself as the motive force behind change, and gives us a world of boundless “becomings:” not “things” that are, but “events” that are happening. The ontological intuition that “only Being is” is at the core of Parmenides’s treatise The Way of Truth and is the basis of the ontology that follows from it.To provide a meaningful contrast with this fundamental assumption of on or “being” we might borrow the Greek notion of zoe or “life” and create the neologism “zoe-tology” as “the art of living.” Zoetology standing in contrast to Greek “ontology,” might be translated into modern Chinese as 生生論shengshenglun. The Book of Changes states that 天地之大德曰生“the greatest capacity of the cosmos is its life-force.” Again, in describing the unfolding confluence of vital “way-making” (dao 道) it observes that 生生之謂易 “it is the ceaseless generating and procreating of life that is meant by ‘change’” (yi 易). Change itself is defined denotatively and thus specifically as procreative living.

In this Book of Changes ecological cosmology, autopoietic, transactional change occurs synchronically in situ and diachronically in media res as expansive and advantageous growth in the vital, situated relations that constitute experience. The interactions of mutual interest expressed among things in their constitutive relations grows and “appreciates” them in the sense of adding value to both themselves and their worlds. Just as human flourishing arises from positive growth in the relations of family and community, cosmic flourishing is isomorphic as an extension of this same kind of transactional growth but only on a more expansive scale. Indeed, human values and a moral cosmic order are both grounded in life and its productive growth, and are thus continuous with each other as complementaries.

The single most important common denominator within the various areas of the Confucian cultural sensorium rehearsed in these pages, from education to ethics, from family to cosmology, is the relationally-constituted conception of persons. In this monograph, then, I have made the argument that the most important contribution Confucian philosophy has to offer our times is precisely its own elaborate, sophisticated, and ethically compelling conception of a relationally-constituted persons that can be drawn upon to critique and to challenge the entrenched ideology of foundational individualism. In particular, at a critical time when we can fairly anticipate a quantum transformation in the changing world cultural order, it is this alternative conception of persons as human becomings that recommends most clearly to me that we would do well to give Confucianism its place at the table.

The argument in these pages has not been that the Confucian values I am advocating can be mustered to solve all of the world’s problems. Nor has the argument been that the ineluctable forces of Westernization are pernicious and need to somehow be contained. Instead, my attempt to bring attention to the Confucian tradition has been that we do well to make room for all of the cultural resources available to us at a time when the most dramatic changes to the human condition in the history of our species are gathering on the horizon. In many ways, the position advanced herein has been compensatory, trying to overcome the kind of ignorance that comes with the uncritical ignoring of an ancient tradition integral to the identity of a quarter of the world’s population. There is much to be valued in this Confucian cultural tradition as a source of enrichment for world culture and as a substantial critique of our existing values, and we would all do well to know it much better than we do.

序言

从一开始，我们安乐哲儒学大家团队便努力实现我们的儒学理念。该书中涉及的讲座、访谈和论文讲述了我们团队的故事（成员有田辰山、温海明、张凯、卞俊峰和孙智慧）的故事。在过去的五年，他们行走于中国各地乃至东亚和世界其他地区的多个国家，走访学习，促进大家对儒家哲学的理解。我们一起深入探讨、研究课题，从最初对该课题之“多”得以宏观掌握，到后来对“一”有了微观细致、独一无二的了解。我们与尼山世界儒学中心孔子研究院、世界儒学文化研究联合会（World Consortium for Research in Confucian Cultures）、国际儒学联合会、北京大学博古睿研究中心、北京外国语大学东西方关系中心、北京师范大学中国文化国际传播研究院、江苏省丹阳市中华传统文化学会、复旦大学杜威研究中心以及其他卓越的机构建立了共同研究，彼此分享的合作关系。

在过去的一代人的时间里，世界的经济和政治秩序发生了巨变，我们已经预见到这种巨大的变化将伴随着新世界文化秩序的出现。我们坚信，儒家哲学的泛亚洲（pan-Asian）传统对这一新世界秩序的产生做出过重要贡献。东亚尤其是中国的迅速崛起在许多方面震惊了以个人主义为根基的自由主义价值观主导的世界。本书的基本论调是，儒家传统对不断变化的世界文化秩序必然能够做出的最重要贡献，是可能替代个人主义意识形态的贡献的。我们要把这种关系构成的“人”（human becomings）的概念置于中国早期过程或“事件”本体论的一般特征之中。在这种本体论中，给予的“事物”与其语境是相互依存、不可分割的。“成人”的意义，远不是指参考一个给定的前因，帮助我们回到原型或达到某些给定的、预先确定的目的(telos) ，事实上它是在不断发展的宇宙秩序背景下的一个临时性的和生成性的过程。我和我的合作者们追随葛兰言（Marcel Granet）、唐君毅、费孝通、李约瑟（Joseph Needham）和葛瑞汉（Angus Graham），主张将这种世界观作为理解古典儒学最合适的语境。

首先，我对比了古希腊本体论意义上的“人”（human beings）概念与《易经》中我称之为过程性的“成人”（human becomings）概念，即作为“存在本身科学”的“本体论”（on-tology）和我称为“生存艺术”的“生生论”（zoe-tology）之间的对比，也是作为名词的“人”（human being）与作为动名词的“人”（human becomings）的对比。约翰•杜威（John Dewey）摒弃他所谓的“哲学谬论”（the philosophical fallacy），并提出了类似观点，提醒我们注意那些固化的习惯和经验，即在经验连续体当中，把某个元素剥离语境并加以本质化。我们需要竭尽全力克服这种事后的因果重构（post hoc diremption），不要把这一同样的元素视为根基性的或者因果性的。一个具体例子是，我们在学习过程中获得了精湛的技巧，从这种持续经历的复杂性中抽象出一种称为“德性”的东西，然后使之抽象成为过程本身的前因和后果。对于杜威来说：

实相就是成长过程本身……真正的存在是整个历史全体，就像历史是其所是一样。将其分为两部分，然后又不得不借助因果力量将它们再次结合起来，二者都是武断和无理的。

古希腊哲学家为我们提供了基于“作为存在的存在”（being qua being）或“由于自身的存在”（being per se）的实体本体论，该本体论保障人类经验有一个永恒不变的主体作为基石。随着“理念”和“目的”作为独立事物的形式因和目的因，如人这种基础性的“实体”（substance）必定会在变化过程中持续存在。杜威所关注的“哲学谬论”恰是基于这种因果思维。在这种本体论中，“存在（to exist）”和“是”（to be）是一个术语的不同侧面。相同的系动词（be）回答了两个问题，首先是某物“为何”（why）存在，即其起源和目的是什么，然后是它是“什么”（what），即其实质是什么。这个基础或本质包含了其存在的目的，并且定义了任何特定事物的“成为这类事物的意谓的某一类”（what it means to be a thing of this kind），从而为其设定了封闭的、排他性的边界，以及它必须是这样而不是那样所需的严格同一性。

关于某物为何（why）存在的问题可以诉诸于对确定的、源初的和不可证明的第一性原理来回答，并在造物主和被造物之间提供形而上的分离。关于某物是什么（what）的问题，可以通过其限度和定义来回答，并提供了实体与偶性之间、本质与其偶然属性之间的本体论区别。在表达事物的必要性、自足性和独立性时，作为谓语主体的实质或本质是知识的对象。它告诉我们——一个逻辑必然性的问题——某物是什么，并且向我们确定地揭示什么是真实的，什么不是事实的真理之源。正如当代哲学家赵汀阳给出了正面的回答，这种实体本体论定义了真实存在（构成有序和结构化宇宙内容）：“西方哲学是对世界的‘字典式’解释，试图建立界定万物的确定理解，简单地说，就是断定‘什么是什么’，一切观念皆为‘在／是’(being/is) 的注脚。”

在《易经》中，我们找到了一个词汇表，这些词汇做出了明确的宇宙论假设，这些假设可以明确替代实体本体论，即通过定位一个整体、有机和生态的世界观来提供儒家经典的解释背景。这种宇宙观从“生”作为变化背后的动力开始，给我们提供了一个无限的“生成”世界：不是“存在的物”，而是正在发生的（happening）“事”。“唯有存在存在”（only Being is）的本体论直观是巴门尼德论真理之路的核心，也是由此产生的本体论的基础。为了与“存在”或“存在”这一基本假设提供有意义的对比，我们可以借用古希腊的“生命”或“生活”概念，创造新词“生生论”（zoe-tology）作为“生活的艺术”。与希腊“本体论”相对的“zoe-tology”可以译成现代汉语“生生论”。《易传》认为“天地之大德曰生”，宇宙最大的能力就是它的生生之力。同样，在描述重要的“道”（way-making）时，它提到“生生之谓易”，即生命不断产生和创造。“易”本身被象征性地定义，因此具体地被定义为创生性生活。

在《易经》这本生态宇宙学著作中，自然创生、交互性的变化同时性地“依境而生”，并历时性地“依缘而生”，在构成经验的重要情境关系中迅速而有利地增长。事物在它们的本构关系中表达，在共同利益的相互作用不断增长，并在为自身和世界增添价值的意义上“欣赏”它们。正如人类的繁荣源于家庭和社群关系的积极正向发展一样，宇宙的繁荣是同构的，是这种交易增长的延伸，只不过是在更广阔的范围内。事实上，人类的价值观和道德宇宙秩序都立足于生命及其生生性增长，因此彼此之间相互补充。

本书从教育学到伦理学，从家庭观到宇宙论，反复讨论了儒家文化各个侧面的一个最重要共同点，这个共同点就是基于关系建构的“人”的概念（relationally-constituted conception of persons）。我提出一个论点，即儒家哲学对我们时代的最重要贡献，恰恰是它自己对基于关系建构的“人”的精细的、复杂的、合乎道德的定义，可以作为批判和挑战根深蒂固的个人主义意识形态基础。尤其是在我们可以相当程度上预测世界文化秩序不断发生的巨变的关键时刻，正是这种“成人”（human becomings）可以成为“人”的替代观念，将明确向我们预示，如果我们让儒家学说有一席之地，这个世界将变得更好。

这部著作的论点并不是说，我所倡导的儒家价值观可以解决世界上所有的问题。也不是说，不可避免的西方化势力是有害的，需要以某种方式加以遏制。相反，我试图引起人们对儒家传统的关注，在人类历史上生存状况最戏剧性变化即将出现之际，我们应该努力地让我们所拥有的各种文化资源都得到利用。在许多方面，本书提出的立场是辅助性的，我们试图克服那种对古老传统不加批判的忽视所带来的无知，而这一传统对世界四分之一的人口来说不可或缺。儒家传统文化有很多值得珍视的东西，它可以成为丰富世界文化的源泉，也可以实质性地批判我们现有的错误的价值观，这个世界因此可以变得比我们想象中的更好。

（黄天夷 译 温海明 校）

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